When it comes to cybersecurity, the kernel is sacred ground. Once compromised, it offers attackers the keys to the kingdom. That’s why Microsoft Defender for Endpoint’s Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules are critical in hardening enterprise environments.

Today, I am spotlighting one very important but sometimes overlooked ASR rules:

Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers

Intune Name: Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers

GUID: 56a863a9-875e-4185-98a7-b882c64b5ce5)

Advanced hunting action type:

• AsrVulnerableSignedDriverAudited
• AsrVulnerableSignedDriverBlocked

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Why This Rule Matters

In recent years, attackers have shifted to exploiting legitimately signed but vulnerable drivers to gain kernel-level access. These drivers are often trusted by the OS due to their signature status, yet harbor security flaws that can be used to:

• Disable security tools like EDR or antivirus,
• Inject malicious code into kernel memory,
• Persist undetected across reboots.

Once attackers load a vulnerable driver, they can effectively operate at ring 0, where traditional defenses struggle to respond.

The ASR rule prevents applications from writing such vulnerable drivers to disk. Blocking one of the most effective paths to escalation.

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How Microsoft Identifies Vulnerable Drivers

Microsoft maintains a curated list of vulnerable drivers, largely informed by:

• CVE disclosures (Primarily)
• Partner and customer telemetry
• Internal security research

When a driver is confirmed to be vulnerable, its signature or hash is added to the blocklist. This ensures that any attempt to introduce it into the environment is proactively stopped.

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New vs. Existing Drivers: What You Need to Know

An important nuance:

• This ASR rule only blocks NEW vulnerable drivers from being written to disk.
• Existing vulnerable drivers already loaded in teh devices will not be impacted by the rule unless they are modified or reinstalled.

This approach is by design and it avoids disrupting legacy systems while still raising the bar on future risk. Vulnerable drivers already in the system will be detected by Microsoft Defender Threat and Vulnerability Management MDTVM

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What Happens During a BIOS or Driver Update with a vulnerable driver?

Here’s a common scenario:

• You push a BIOS update across your fleet.
• The update includes a vulnerable driver.
• The ASR rule kicks in and blocks the driver from executing.

At this point, your team has two options:

1. Evaluate and accept the risk by adding an exclusion for the driver (not recommended unless absolutely necessary),
2. Reach out to the vendor for a new, patched version of the driver.

The ASR rule is working exactly as intended here—protecting your environment from known kernel-level exploits.

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Visibility Through Advanced Hunting

To monitor ASR rule activity related to this feature, use these action types in Microsoft 365 Defender’s Advanced Hunting:

• AsrVulnerableSignedDriverAudited
• AsrVulnerableSignedDriverBlocked

These events provide insight into attempted driver installs, blocked actions, and any exclusions in place.

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Best Practices for Deployment

• Start in audit mode to evaluate potential impact in your environment.
• Monitor activity via Defender advanced hunting.
• Gradually shift to block mode once you’ve validated that critical business apps are not affected.
• Educate device management teams about potential driver update issues and escalation paths.

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Final Thoughts

ASR’s “Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers” rule is a proactive, targeted defense against a stealthy and growing threat vector. It’s a perfect example of security-by-default, letting organizations reap the benefits of Microsoft’s threat intelligence without needing to build and maintain their own vulnerable driver databases.

Implement it. Monitor it. And rest easier knowing that one more kernel exploit vector just got locked down.